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Abstract
At ﬁrst glance, it may seem that revolutions happen when life becomes really intolerable. However, historical analysis shows a diﬀerent
story: that revolutions happen not when life becomes intolerable, but
when a reasonably prosperous level of living suddenly worsens. This empirical observation seems to contradict traditional decision theory ideas,
according to which, in general, people’s happiness monotonically depends
on their level of living. A more detailed model of human behavior, however, takes into account not only the current level of living, but also future
expectations. In this paper, we show that if we properly take these future expectations into account, then we get a natural explanation of the
revolution phenomenon.

1

Formulation of the Problem

When revolutions happen: usual understanding. People usually believe
that revolutions happen when the situation worsens to such extent that life
under the old regime becomes practically intolerable. Paraphrasing the famous
saying attributed to Marie-Antoinette, people start a revolution when they do
not even have enough bread to eat.
When revolutions actually happen. However, a historical analysis shows
that the usual understanding is wrong; see, e.g., [1, 2, 3]. Most revolutions
happen not when the situation is at its worst, they usually happen when the
situation has been improving for some time and then suddenly gets worse –
although, by the way, never as bad as it was before the improvement started.
How can we explain this? This is an interesting observation, but it leaves
one puzzled: why? There are well-designed theories of human decision making,
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and experiments show that in most situations, people act rationally: the more
their needs are satisﬁed, in general, the happier they are.
So how come that right before the revolution, when the level of living is
higher (often much higher) than in the recent past, people are so much less happy
that they start a revolution – while in the past, when their living conditions were
much worse, they were suﬃciently satisﬁed – at least so as to remain obedient.
How can we explain this unexpected (and somewhat counterintuitive) behavior?
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we show that this seemingly
counterintuitive revolution phenomenon can actually be well explained within
the standard decision theory.

2

Analysis of the Problem

Traditional decision theory: a brief reminder. According to traditional
decision theory, people’s preferences are described by numerical values called
utilities; see, e.g., [4, 5, 6, 7, 9].
The actions of a person are determined not just by this person’s current level
of satisfaction – as described by the current utility value u0 – but also by the
expected future utility values u1 at the next moment of time, u2 in the second
next moment of time, etc. The future utility values come with a discount; e.g.,
the possibility to buy a new car a few years in the future does not bring as much
happiness as buying a car right away.
This is similar to the value of future money: future money is less valuable
than the same amount right now, since if we have the same amount – say $1000
– now, we can place it in a bank and, due to accumulating interest, get a larger
amount in the future. If we denote the annual interest rate by α, then after
year t, each invested dollar will turn into (1 + α)t dollars. Thus, $1 at time t
1
def
is equivalent to q t dollars now, where we denoted q =
. So, if we get the
1+α
amount a0 now, the amount a1 in the next year, the amount a2 in 2 years, etc.,
this is equivalent to getting the following amount now:
a0 + q · a1 + q 2 · a2 + . . .
A similar formula can be used to describe the overall utility based on the
current utility u0 and expected future utilities
u0 + q · u1 + q 2 · u2 + . . .

This general approach requires extrapolation. The future amounts are
based on extrapolation. So, to apply this theory to our situation, we need to
understand how exactly people extrapolate.
In general, extrapolations means that:

2

• we select a family of functions characterized by a few parameters
ut = f (p1 , . . . , pn , t),
• then we ﬁnd the values pb1 , . . . , pbn of the parameters that best ﬁt the
observed data u0 , u−1 , u−2 , etc., i.e., for which
f (p1 , . . . , pn , 0) ≈ u0 , f (p1 , . . . , pn , −1) ≈ u−1 , . . . ,
• and then we use these values to predict future values as f (b
p1 , . . . , pbn , t).
It is reasonable to use models which are linear in the its parameters.
A reasonable idea is to use models that linearly depend on the corresponding
parameters: for such models, matching parameters to data means solving systems of linear equations, which is very feasible and much easier than solving
systems of nonlinear equations – which are, in general, NP-hard.
n
∑
Thus, we consider models of the type ut =
pi · fi (t), where fi (t) are given
i=1

functions, and pi are appropriate parameters.
Which basis functions fi (t) should we choose? Most transitions are
smooth, so it is reasonable to require that all the functions fi (t) used to extrapolation are smooth.
Another reasonable requirement is related to the fact that the numerical
value of time depends on the choice of a measuring unit – years or months –
and on the choice of a starting time. For example, during the French revolution,
the year of storming the Bastille was considered Year 1.
If we change a measuring unit by a new one which is a times smaller, then
each original value t is replaced by the new value a · t. Similarly, if we change
the original starting point with the new starting point which is b units in the
past, then the original value t is replaced by the new value t + b.
The general formulas for extrapolation should not depend on such an arbitrary things as selecting a unit of time or selecting a starting
is
{ npoint. It }
∑
therefore reasonable to assume that the approximating family
pi · fi (t)
i=1

will not change if we simply re-scale time to t → a · t or to t → t + b.
In other words, we require that for every a > 0 and for every b, we have
{ n
}
{ n
}
{ n
}
∑
∑
∑
pi · fi (a · t)
=
pi · fi (t + b)
=
pi · fi (t)
i=1

p1 ,...,pn

i=1

p1 ,...,pn

i=1

p1 ,...,pn

It turns out that under these conditions, all the basic functions – and thus, all
their linear combinations – are polynomials; see, e.g., [8].
Thus, it is reasonable to approximate the actual history by a polynomial. Let
us show, on a simple example, that this indeed explains the empirical revolution
phenomenon.
Two simple situations. Speciﬁcally, we will compare two simple situations:
3

.

• a situation in which the level of living is consistently bad, i.e.,
u0 = u−1 = . . . = u−k = . . . = c1
for some small value c1 , and
• a situation in which the level of living used to be much better, but now
somewhat decreased, i.e., in which
u−1 = u−2 = . . . = c+
but u0 = c− < c+ – although this decreased value u0 = c− is still better
than the value c1 from the ﬁrst situation.
If people did not take their future happiness into account when making decision,
the situation would have been very straightforward – and in full accordance with
the commonsense understanding of the revolutions: people in the ﬁrst situation
would be much less happy than people in the second situation and therefore,
more prone to start a revolution.
What will happen if we take future expectations into account? In the ﬁrst
situation, of course, a reasonable extrapolation should lead to the exact same
small value u0 = c; thus, the overall utility is equal to
u0 + q · u1 + . . . = c · (1 + q + q 2 + . . .) =

c
.
1−q

But what to expect in the second situation?
Let us start with the simplest possible extrapolation. Let us start our
analysis with the simplest possible extrapolation, when we make our future
predictions based only on two utility values: the current utility value u0 and
the previous utility value u−1 .
Which degree polynomials should we use? In this case, we have two values
u0 and u−1 to ﬁt the model, so it is reasonable to select the degree of the
approximating polynomial for which the corresponding family of polynomials
depends on exactly two parameters. Polynomials of a general degree d have the
form
a0 + a1 · t + . . . + ad · td .
This family depend on d + 1 parameters ai , so in our case, we should have
d + 1 = 2 and d = 1 – i.e., we should use linear functions for extrapolation.
Since u0 < u−1 , we thus get a linear decreasing function. Its values tend to
−∞ as the time t increases. So, when q is close to 1, the corresponding value
u0 + q · u1 + . . . ≈ u0 + u1 + u2 + . . .
becomes very negative – and this explains why in the second situation, the
revolution is much more probable.
What about more realistic approximation schemes? One may think that
the above explanation is caused by our oversimpliﬁcation of the extrapolation
4

model. Of course, linear extrapolation is a very crude and oversimpliﬁed idea.
What happens if we use higher degree polynomials for extrapolation?
Let us assume that for extrapolation, we use polynomials of order d. The
corresponding family of polynomials have d1 parameters, so we can ﬁt d + 1
values. Thus, if we use these polynomials, then, in our extrapolation, we can
use not only the two values u0 and u−1 , we can use d + 1 values
u0 , u−1 , . . . , u−d .
Let us ﬁnd the polynomial P (t) of degree d that ﬁts all these values, i.e., for
which P (−i) = c+ for all i from 1 to d, and P (0) = c− . These conditions become
def

even easier if we consider an auxiliary polynomial Q(t) = P (t) − c+ . For this
auxiliary polynomial, we have Q(−d) = . . . = Q(−1) = 0 and Q(0) = c− − c+ .
This polynomial of degree d has d roots t = −1, . . . , t = −d, thus, it is divisible
by the monomials t − (−i) = t + i for all i from 1 to d, and therefore, it has the
form Q(t) = C ·(t+1)·(t+2)·. . .·(t+d), for some constant C. This constant can
be determined from the condition that Q(0) = c− −c+ , so C ·1·2·. . .·d = c− −c+
and thus,
c− − c+
C=
.
1 · 2 · ... · d
Therefore, for any t > 0, the extrapolated value of P (t) = c+ + Q(t) has the
form
(t + 1) · (t + 2) · . . . · (t + d)
Q(t) = c+ + (c− − c+ ) ·
.
1 · 2 · ... · d
Since c− < c+ , this value is negative – and tends to −∞ as the time t increases.
In comparison with the linear extrapolation case, it tends to −∞ even faster
than in the case of linear extrapolation – as td .
So, the revolution phenomenon can be explained no matter what degree of
extrapolation we use.
Discussion. Based on our analysis, in addition to our main conclusion (that
we have explained the seemingly counterintuitive revolution phenomenon), we
can make two auxiliary conclusions (which also ﬁt perfectly well with common
sense):
• revolutions only happen if people care about the future; if they don’t, if
q ≈ 0, people are happy with their present-day level of living.
• the more into the past the people go in their analysis, the more probable
it is that they will revolt; people who do not know their history are less
prone to revolutions than people who do.
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